syncfusion-vue-ai-assistview
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill documents features that ingest untrusted data, which is a potential surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: File uploads via the
enableAttachmentsproperty (referenced inreferences/attachments.md) and external AI service responses (referenced inreferences/ai-integration.md). - Boundary markers: The documentation provides best practices recommending the use of explicit delimiters and prompt engineering to ignore embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory: The component can perform network requests to AI APIs and render complex UI elements through generative UI tools.
- Sanitization: The documentation explicitly recommends using
DOMPurifyto sanitize HTML content before rendering user-provided or AI-generated strings. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill includes a
registerToolUImethod that allows developers to define custom UI components using templates and JavaScript handler functions (referenced inreferences/generative-ui.md). This is a standard extensibility feature for UI frameworks and is documented with instructions on how to manage props and event listeners safely. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation references several external resources and endpoints:
- Packages: Standard Syncfusion NPM packages like
@syncfusion/ej2-vue-interactive-chatand associated theme packages. - Endpoints: Legitimate file upload demonstration services hosted on
services.syncfusion.comand official API endpoints for OpenAI, Google Gemini, and Anthropic Claude. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: Code examples for AI integration use environment variables (e.g.,
process.env.VUE_APP_OPENAI_KEY) or clearly marked placeholders (e.g.,sk-xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx), which aligns with secure development practices.
Audit Metadata