google-video-understanding
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script uses
subprocess.runto call the macOSmdlsutility for extracting video duration metadata. The command is executed using a list of arguments rather than a shell string, which effectively prevents shell injection vulnerabilities. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
scripts/run_video_analysis.shscript automates the installation of thegoogle-genaiandyt-dlppackages. These are well-known, legitimate libraries fetched from standard registries to support the skill's core functionality. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an indirect prompt injection surface as it ingests untrusted data from external sources and interpolates it into LLM prompts.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the context via YouTube metadata (extracted by
yt-dlp) and the contents of a user-specified file provided through the--prompt-fileargument. - Boundary markers: The skill does not use specific delimiters or instructions to isolate external content from the system prompt.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute system commands (
mdls), perform network operations (Gemini API), and write files to disk (Path.write_text). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of content sanitization or validation for the ingested data before it is sent to the model.
Audit Metadata