skills/synthenova/skills/langfuse-cli/Gen Agent Trust Hub

langfuse-cli

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 23, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The wrapper script scripts/langfuse-cli executes a binary located at a hardcoded absolute path within a specific user's directory: /home/lamrin/.cache/uv/archive-v0/Hj__dDMjU1XU-7V8sJzvv/bin/mcp2cli. Executing code from a specific user's cache directory is highly insecure as the binary's integrity cannot be verified and it relies on an environment that is not managed by the skill's own configuration.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill retrieves and processes untrusted data from Langfuse, including trace logs, observations, and prompt templates, which can contain instructions targeting the agent.
  • Ingestion points: External data is ingested through tools like fetch-traces, fetch-observations, and get-prompt (defined in SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: The skill documentation does not mention or implement any delimiters or boundary markers to isolate retrieved data from system instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell commands via the scripts/langfuse-cli wrapper and write to the filesystem (log files).
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the external data before it is interpolated into the agent's context.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's primary interface is a bash script that wraps tool calls, providing a surface for command execution and potential argument manipulation if input is not handled carefully, though the use of "$@" in the exec call is a standard practice.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Aug 23, 2026, 04:06 PM