langfuse-cli
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 23, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The wrapper script
scripts/langfuse-cliexecutes a binary located at a hardcoded absolute path within a specific user's directory:/home/lamrin/.cache/uv/archive-v0/Hj__dDMjU1XU-7V8sJzvv/bin/mcp2cli. Executing code from a specific user's cache directory is highly insecure as the binary's integrity cannot be verified and it relies on an environment that is not managed by the skill's own configuration. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill retrieves and processes untrusted data from Langfuse, including trace logs, observations, and prompt templates, which can contain instructions targeting the agent.
- Ingestion points: External data is ingested through tools like
fetch-traces,fetch-observations, andget-prompt(defined inSKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The skill documentation does not mention or implement any delimiters or boundary markers to isolate retrieved data from system instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to execute shell commands via the
scripts/langfuse-cliwrapper and write to the filesystem (log files). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the external data before it is interpolated into the agent's context.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's primary interface is a bash script that wraps tool calls, providing a surface for command execution and potential argument manipulation if input is not handled carefully, though the use of
"$@"in theexeccall is a standard practice.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata