posthog-cli
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 23, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The wrapper script
scripts/posthog-cliexecutes a binary using a hardcoded absolute path pointing to a specific user's home directory:/home/lamrin/.cache/uv/archive-v0/Hj__dDMjU1XU-7V8sJzvv/bin/mcp2cli. Executing binaries from user-specific cache directories is a high-risk pattern that can lead to execution of untrusted or pre-seeded malicious code. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill depends on an external binary
mcp2clithat is not included in the skill source. The script assumes this binary exists within a specificuvcache folder, implying it was downloaded from a remote registry. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill documentation instructs users to manually export the sensitive
POSTHOG_TOKENinto their shell environment. This exposes the raw secret to any process with environment access and stores it in the user's shell history. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection from PostHog data.
- Ingestion points: Data fetched from PostHog APIs, including documentation (
docs-search), event logs (logs-query), and analytics results. - Boundary markers: The skill does not implement delimiters or system instructions to ignore instructions embedded in the external data.
- Capability inventory: The skill can perform state-changing operations such as deleting insights, updating feature flags, and creating dashboards.
- Sanitization: No evidence of output sanitization or validation is present in the wrapper script.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata