skills/szoloth/skills/mcp-builder/Gen Agent Trust Hub

mcp-builder

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 30, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The provided evaluation harness (scripts/evaluation.py) executes local shell commands to launch and test MCP servers.
  • Evidence: In scripts/connections.py, the MCPConnectionStdio class uses the mcp.client.stdio.stdio_client to spawn subprocesses using the command, args, and env parameters provided via the CLI.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The evaluation script processes output from external MCP servers during testing without adequate sanitization, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: scripts/evaluation.py (line 107) captures the result of connection.call_tool.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; the EVALUATION_PROMPT (lines 18-51) does not include delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands in tool outputs.
  • Capability inventory: The harness allows calling any tool exposed by the server under test, which may include command execution (scripts/connections.py, line 41).
  • Sanitization: Absent; the tool response is directly converted to a string and passed back to the LLM context.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions direct the agent to fetch documentation from external repositories and domains.
  • Evidence: SKILL.md (lines 53, 62, 70) contains instructions to use WebFetch for URLs targeting modelcontextprotocol.io and raw.githubusercontent.com/modelcontextprotocol/*. These are official documentation sources for the Model Context Protocol.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jun 30, 2026, 08:26 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — mcp-builder