mcp-builder
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 30, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The provided evaluation harness (
scripts/evaluation.py) executes local shell commands to launch and test MCP servers. - Evidence: In
scripts/connections.py, theMCPConnectionStdioclass uses themcp.client.stdio.stdio_clientto spawn subprocesses using thecommand,args, andenvparameters provided via the CLI. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The evaluation script processes output from external MCP servers during testing without adequate sanitization, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/evaluation.py(line 107) captures the result ofconnection.call_tool. - Boundary markers: Absent; the
EVALUATION_PROMPT(lines 18-51) does not include delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands in tool outputs. - Capability inventory: The harness allows calling any tool exposed by the server under test, which may include command execution (
scripts/connections.py, line 41). - Sanitization: Absent; the tool response is directly converted to a string and passed back to the LLM context.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions direct the agent to fetch documentation from external repositories and domains.
- Evidence:
SKILL.md(lines 53, 62, 70) contains instructions to useWebFetchfor URLs targetingmodelcontextprotocol.ioandraw.githubusercontent.com/modelcontextprotocol/*. These are official documentation sources for the Model Context Protocol.
Audit Metadata