skills/szoloth/skills/memory-store/Gen Agent Trust Hub

memory-store

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 30, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute a custom CLI tool at ~/.claude/bin/claude-memory and perform file system operations (read, write, move, and truncate) on files within the ~/.claude/ directory. This includes destructive operations like clearing the memory store using shell redirection and mv commands.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill architecture is susceptible to indirect prompt injection. It processes raw session transcripts from ~/.claude/diary/ into patterns, which can then be promoted to active rules stored in CLAUDE.md. Malicious instructions embedded in past interactions could potentially bypass filters and influence future agent behavior.
  • Ingestion points: Raw session transcripts in ~/.claude/diary/ act as the entry point for untrusted data into the memory pipeline.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not define delimiters or specific "ignore embedded instructions" warnings for the content being processed into rules.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands, modify its own core instruction set (CLAUDE.md), and manipulate local files in the user's home directory.
  • Sanitization: Absent. There is no evidence of filtering, escaping, or validation logic intended to prevent malicious instructions within session diaries from being extracted as patterns.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jun 30, 2026, 08:26 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — memory-store