memory-store
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute a custom CLI tool at
~/.claude/bin/claude-memoryand perform file system operations (read, write, move, and truncate) on files within the~/.claude/directory. This includes destructive operations like clearing the memory store using shell redirection andmvcommands. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill architecture is susceptible to indirect prompt injection. It processes raw session transcripts from
~/.claude/diary/into patterns, which can then be promoted to active rules stored inCLAUDE.md. Malicious instructions embedded in past interactions could potentially bypass filters and influence future agent behavior. - Ingestion points: Raw session transcripts in
~/.claude/diary/act as the entry point for untrusted data into the memory pipeline. - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not define delimiters or specific "ignore embedded instructions" warnings for the content being processed into rules.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands, modify its own core instruction set (
CLAUDE.md), and manipulate local files in the user's home directory. - Sanitization: Absent. There is no evidence of filtering, escaping, or validation logic intended to prevent malicious instructions within session diaries from being extracted as patterns.
Audit Metadata