vercel-react-best-practices
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 30, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Deceptive metadata and attribution. The skill claims in its YAML frontmatter (author: vercel) and body text ("maintained by Vercel", "Vercel Engineering") to be an official resource from Vercel, which contradicts the actual author identity SZoloth provided in the context.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Indirect prompt injection vulnerability surface. The skill's primary function is to ingest and process untrusted user-provided React/Next.js code for refactoring and optimization.
- Ingestion points: User components, pages, and configuration files (referenced in SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not instruct the agent to ignore instructions embedded in comments or strings within the processed code.
- Capability inventory: The agent using this skill likely has access to file-write and potentially shell execution tools to perform the suggested refactorings.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the input code is performed before processing.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Recommends the installation of external third-party libraries including 'better-all' from a personal GitHub repository (github.com/shuding/better-all) and 'lru-cache' (github.com/isaacs/node-lru-cache).
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Instructions for external tool execution. The skill (rules/rendering-svg-precision.md) instructs users or agents to execute 'npx svgo' to optimize SVG files, which involves running an external binary.
Audit Metadata