full-review-pr
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONMETADATA_POISONING
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and processes untrusted data from GitHub PRs and Jira tasks, creating an attack surface where malicious code or descriptions could attempt to influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: SKILL.md (Workflow Step 1 and 3) describes reading the PR title, description, diff, and associated Jira issue content.
- Boundary markers: The instructions for the Moderator and Analyst agents do not define clear delimiters (e.g., XML tags or specific markers) or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the analyzed code.
- Capability inventory: The system can perform local checkouts via
gh pr checkout, read file system content, and delegate tasks to other AI models. - Sanitization: The workflow does not specify any sanitization or escaping of the external content before passing it to the sub-agents.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the GitHub CLI to perform local operations.
- Evidence: SKILL.md specifies the use of
gh pr checkout <number>to bring PR code into the local environment for analysis. - [METADATA_POISONING]: The skill references non-existent or fictional model versions which may lead to unpredictable behavior depending on how the platform resolves these identifiers.
- Evidence:
references/moderator.mdandreferences/pr-comments.mdreference models such asgpt-6-astra,gpt-6.1-sol,claude-opus-5-5, andclaude-fable-5-1.
Audit Metadata