leaving-pr-comments

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 6, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external, untrusted data from pull requests, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.\n
  • Ingestion points: The workflow involves reading the pull request head, code diffs, comment history, and thread data (SKILL.md).\n
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not define specific delimiters or directives to ignore instructions embedded within the ingested data.\n
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses permissions to post top-level comments, reply to existing threads, and resolve discussion threads on the repository (SKILL.md).\n
  • Sanitization: While the instructions recommend checking for private data, they lack specific measures to sanitize or escape pull request content to mitigate instructional injection.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 6, 2026, 05:35 PM