delegate-to-opencode
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates a delegation workflow where sub-agents process external data, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Sub-agents read task briefs from
prompt.mdand analyze code within the specified work directory. - Boundary markers: The skill does not provide mechanisms or instructions for delimiting untrusted data from the system prompt, which may lead the sub-agent to follow instructions embedded in the project files or the brief itself.
- Capability inventory: The sub-agent configurations (
editor.mdandreviewer.md) includebashfor shell command execution,editfor file modifications, andwebfetchfor outbound network requests. - Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing the task brief or the code files before they are processed by the sub-agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions direct the primary agent to execute various shell commands, including directory creation (
mkdir), file copying (cp), and initializing git worktrees (git worktree add). These commands are used to set up the execution environment for the sub-agent. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The sub-agent profiles are configured with
webfetch: allow. This permission allows the agent to communicate with external web services. In the event of a successful prompt injection attack, this capability could be abused to exfiltrate sensitive data, such as environment variables or source code, to a remote server.
Audit Metadata