plotloom-video-adapter
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the execution of external CLI tools to perform its primary functions.
- Evidence: The instructions in
SKILL.mdandreferences/dreamina-cli.mdexplicitly direct the agent to execute commands such asdreamina text2video,dreamina query_result, andplotloom video submit. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from external markdown files to derive arguments for shell commands, creating an attack surface where malicious data could influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads from
video-prompts.mdandvideo-prompts-en.mdas specified inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Instructions suggest extracting "model-facing prose," but there are no formal delimiters or systemic protections against instructions embedded within those files.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute shell commands (
dreamina,plotloom) and perform file system operations (writing.mp4files and markdown notes). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of programmatic sanitization or escaping of the content extracted from the prompt files before it is passed to the CLI.
- [DATA_EXPOSURE]: Documentation within the skill contains hardcoded absolute paths that reveal specific host environment details.
- Evidence:
references/dreamina-cli.mdcontains the hardcoded path/Users/wangguiping/.hermes/profiles/nova/home/.local/bin/dreamina, which exposes a specific username and filesystem structure.
Audit Metadata