babysit-pr
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from GitHub Pull Requests and local repository files, exposing the agent to instructions from external actors.
- Ingestion points: The
scripts/pr-waittool fetches and displays comment bodies, review summaries, and thread replies from GitHub. Additionally,SKILL.mdinstructs the agent to read repository-specific rule files located at.macroscope/check-run-agents/*.md. - Boundary markers: Content retrieved from GitHub is output to the agent's monitor tool without formal delimiters to isolate untrusted text from system instructions.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to execute shell commands, manage files, and interact further with the GitHub API, making it a target for instructions embedded in PR content.
- Sanitization: The
scripts/pr-waitscript provides basic sanitization by stripping HTML tags and collapsing whitespace in ingested content to prevent formatting-based injection. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing the
ghcommand-line tool to perform its operations. - Evidence:
scripts/pr-waitusessubprocess.runto callgh api,gh pr view, andgh pr checks. Parameters such as the PR number and repository owner/name are validated against strict regular expressions before being passed to the shell.
Audit Metadata