using-tensor-compiler-engineering
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and analyze external tensor program specifications, IR graphs, and compilation manifests, which creates a potential surface for indirect prompt injection. 1. Ingestion points:
SKILL.mdandir-contracts-and-semantic-identity.mddetail the processing of source IR, target graphs, and artifact manifests. 2. Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit boundary delimiters or warnings to treat ingested content as untrusted data. 3. Capability inventory: The skill leveragestorch.fxfor runtime code generation andtorch.compilefor execution, which could be misused if the agent follows instructions embedded in the processed data. 4. Sanitization: There are no sanitization or verification steps to ensure that the ingested specifications do not contain malicious natural language instructions. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on PyTorch's
torch.fxandtorch.compilesystems for graph capture and transformation. As documented intorch-fx-capture-and-transformation.md, theGraphModule.recompile()function is used to dynamically generate and execute Python code at runtime from a graph representation. While this is a standard and necessary operation for tensor compilation, it represents a runtime code generation capability.
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