local-tools
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 29, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill utilizes a helper script (
device-mcp.py) that downloads external code from an "operator-approved HTTPS repository" and usesuv syncto manage dependencies.\n- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The automated preparation process installs pinned source code and registers stdio entrypoints for the Model Context Protocol (MCP), creating a mechanism for executing remote-sourced code.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions direct the agent to run various shell commands for tool discovery and environmental setup, includingpython3,uv sync,command -v, and tool-specific health checks.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The agent is instructed to read from historical state stores in~/.moru/(lessons) and~/.moru/project-memory/. This ingestion of previously generated or recorded data provides a surface for indirect prompt injection.\n - Ingestion points:
~/.moru/and~/.moru/project-memory/.\n - Boundary markers: The guidance notes that metadata should be "content-free" and content is "bounded," but technical isolation markers are not defined.\n
- Capability inventory: The agent can execute scripts, install packages via
uv, and perform file system operations.\n - Sanitization: The policy specifies what should not be stored (prompts, secrets), but there is no mechanism for sanitizing data upon retrieval.\n- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The documentation mentions that the tool may request "sandbox escalation" when performing device-level verification tasks.
Audit Metadata