kstack-handoff
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates a multi-agent architecture where a 'root' agent manages several autonomous 'child' agents. This setup introduces an attack surface where malicious instructions could be passed from a child agent to the root agent.
- Ingestion points: The root agent receives task updates, questions, and completion reports from child agents through the
intercomtool (e.g.,intercom({ action: "send", ... })). - Boundary markers: There are no specified delimiters or instructions for the root agent to ignore potential prompt injections embedded in the messages received from child agents.
- Capability inventory: The root agent possesses significant capabilities, including file system operations via
gitandwt, terminal workspace management viaherdrandtern, and repository interaction via theghCLI. - Sanitization: The instructions do not define a process for sanitizing or validating the content of messages received from child agents before they are processed by the root agent or relayed to the user.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing various shell commands to orchestrate the development environment and manage child agent lifecycles.
- Evidence: Extensive use of
git,wt(worktree),herdr, andternCLIs to create workspaces, split panes, and manage sessions across different terminal environments. - Evidence: The skill uses
tern send <block> paste "$(cat /tmp/ho-<feature>-<task>.md)"to dynamically read and transmit instruction files between terminals. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions include a step to install an external plugin for the agent platform.
- Evidence: It suggests running
omp plugin install pi-intercomif the communication tool is missing.
Audit Metadata