android-profiler
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads the
trace_processorbinary fromhttps://get.perfetto.dev/trace_processorand multiple helper scripts (e.g.,java_heap_dump,record_android_trace) fromhttps://raw.githubusercontent.com/google/perfetto/main/tools. These downloads target official and trusted Google domains. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill executes the downloaded
trace_processorbinary and helper scripts after setting executable permissions viachmod +x. While the sources are trusted, this represents a remote-to-local execution pattern. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill frequently uses shell commands to manage the profiling environment, including starting background servers (
trace_processor server unix), executing SQL queries, and running recording scripts with user-supplied arguments like package names. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external, potentially untrusted Android Perfetto trace files to perform analysis. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: External trace files (paths or URLs) are ingested in
perfetto_trace_analysis.mdandtriage.md. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore potentially malicious instructions embedded within the trace data or metadata.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute shell commands, run SQL queries, and write analysis reports to the file system.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or strict schema validation for the ingested trace data before it is processed by agent-generated SQL queries.
Audit Metadata