capture
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONMETADATA_POISONING
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes an external file,
checklist.html, to determine the sequence of steps for UI interaction and screenshot capture. - Ingestion points:
tmp/issues/<issue番号>/checklist.html(Step 2). - Boundary markers: Absent. The agent is instructed to read the "UI script" section and follow the steps provided.
- Capability inventory: Uses the
Bashtool and calls the/chrome-devtools-cliskill based on the contents of the external file. - Sanitization: Absent. If an attacker can control the contents of the checklist file, they could potentially influence the agent to perform unintended browser actions or shell commands.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill accepts user-supplied input via
$ARGUMENTS(specifically the<issue>parameter) and interpolates it into file system paths used by tools likeRead,Write, andBash. - Evidence: Paths like
tmp/issues/<issue番号>/are constructed using this input. Without explicit sanitization instructions, this creates a surface for path traversal attacks if the agent does not validate the input before using it in shell-mediated tool calls. - [METADATA_POISONING]: The skill records execution metadata into a persistent local configuration file.
- Evidence: Step 6 describes writing
issue,cause,workaround, anddateto~/.agents/.skills-config/capture/config.json. - Risk: If an issue name or workaround description contains malicious patterns, they could be persisted into the global configuration and potentially affect the logic of future executions (e.g., in Step 4 where the agent attempts to use "known methods" from this config).
Audit Metadata