skills/tanabee/skills/open/Gen Agent Trust Hub

open

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Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically generates shell commands using file paths and configuration values. Specifically, the instructions for opening browsers use nohup "<command>" <args...> "<file://absolute-path>". The use of unquoted <args...> provides a vector for argument injection or arbitrary command execution if the configuration file or the environment contains malicious entries.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Executable paths and runtime arguments are retrieved from config.json files located in the project root or the user's home directory (~/.agents/.skills-config/open/config.json). This mechanism allows for the runtime modification of the commands executed by the agent, which could be exploited if an attacker can manipulate these configuration files.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes file and folder paths as input from the local environment. This creates an attack surface where a maliciously crafted filename (e.g., containing shell metacharacters) could attempt to influence the generated command line.
  • Ingestion points: File/folder paths passed to the Bash tool.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; the instructions rely on the LLM to properly quote variables.
  • Capability inventory: Uses Bash for command execution (open, grip, nohup, pgrep, curl).
  • Sanitization: None specified beyond resolving paths to absolute locations.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill utilizes the grip tool to render Markdown content, which operates by sending the content to the GitHub API. This results in the transmission of local file data to a third-party service. While GitHub is a well-known service, this behavior constitutes an external data transit that users should be aware of.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 8, 2026, 06:48 AM