retro
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill reads conversation logs (
*.jsonl) and usage metadata (facets/*.json) from the~/.claude/directory. These files contain the history of all user interactions, which may include sensitive information, private data, or credentials shared during past sessions. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its core functionality of processing historical data to create new system rules.
- Ingestion points: Ingests historical conversation logs (
~/.claude/projects/.../*.jsonl) and session insights (~/.claude/usage-data/facets/*.json) which contain arbitrary user-provided content from previous sessions. - Boundary markers: None. The logic does not define delimiters or instructions to distinguish between intended user feedback and potentially malicious instructions hidden in past data.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses high-privilege tools such as
Edit,Write,Bash, andWebFetchto apply the resulting "improvements" to global and project-specific configuration files. - Sanitization: None mentioned. The skill identifies "signals" from raw message content and proposes them as permanent configuration changes without sanitization or safety checks beyond a user confirmation step.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches best practice guidelines and documentation from official Anthropic and Claude Code domains, such as
code.claude.com,www.anthropic.com, andclaude.comto validate proposed changes. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Executes shell commands via the
Bashtool, specifically calling theclaudeCLI with the/insightsparameter to generate session metadata and usingdatefor timestamping logs.
Audit Metadata