baoyu-post-to-wechat

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 23, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses various system-level commands to automate browser interactions and clipboard operations across different platforms.
  • Evidence: Uses osascript on macOS, powershell.exe on Windows, and xdotool/ydotool/xclip/wl-copy on Linux to simulate keystrokes (Cmd+V/Ctrl+V) and manage the system clipboard for pasting HTML and images.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches required components and assets from external services at runtime.
  • Evidence: Downloads code syntax highlighting definitions from the Doocs project's Alibaba OSS CDN (cdn-doocs.oss-cn-shenzhen.aliyuncs.com) and renders diagrams via the official PlantUML service.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Dynamically imports scripts for syntax highlighting from a remote CDN.
  • Evidence: scripts/md/utils/languages.ts uses dynamic import() to load highlight.js language modules from a well-known third-party CDN at runtime.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it processes user-provided markdown content that influences agent behavior.
  • Ingestion points: Markdown or plain text files provided by the user (e.g., scripts/wechat-article.ts).
  • Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or "ignore" instructions are used to wrap the untrusted content.
  • Capability inventory: Subprocess execution via spawnSync, network requests via fetch, and full browser control via Chrome DevTools Protocol (CDP).
  • Sanitization: Content is parsed using standard markdown libraries without additional sanitization or instruction filtering.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jun 23, 2026, 01:51 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — baoyu-post-to-wechat