baoyu-post-to-wechat
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses various system-level commands to automate browser interactions and clipboard operations across different platforms.
- Evidence: Uses
osascripton macOS,powershell.exeon Windows, andxdotool/ydotool/xclip/wl-copyon Linux to simulate keystrokes (Cmd+V/Ctrl+V) and manage the system clipboard for pasting HTML and images. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches required components and assets from external services at runtime.
- Evidence: Downloads code syntax highlighting definitions from the Doocs project's Alibaba OSS CDN (
cdn-doocs.oss-cn-shenzhen.aliyuncs.com) and renders diagrams via the official PlantUML service. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Dynamically imports scripts for syntax highlighting from a remote CDN.
- Evidence:
scripts/md/utils/languages.tsuses dynamicimport()to load highlight.js language modules from a well-known third-party CDN at runtime. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it processes user-provided markdown content that influences agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: Markdown or plain text files provided by the user (e.g.,
scripts/wechat-article.ts). - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or "ignore" instructions are used to wrap the untrusted content.
- Capability inventory: Subprocess execution via
spawnSync, network requests viafetch, and full browser control via Chrome DevTools Protocol (CDP). - Sanitization: Content is parsed using standard markdown libraries without additional sanitization or instruction filtering.
Audit Metadata