solidcraft-contributing
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data by reading GitHub issues (
gh issue view --comments) and pull request lists (gh pr list). This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where an attacker could embed malicious instructions in an issue or PR description to influence the agent's actions. - Ingestion points: The skill reads external data via
gh issue view,gh pr list, and local repository files likeplan/STATUS.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit boundary markers or specific warnings to ignore embedded commands within the fetched GitHub content.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to powerful tools including
git,gh(GitHub CLI),cargo(Rust build tool), andsolidcraft-cli. It can perform file writes, project builds, and network operations to GitHub. - Sanitization: No specific sanitization, escaping, or filtering of the content retrieved from GitHub is performed before it is presented to the agent context.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill frequently uses shell commands to manage the development environment and project lifecycle.
- Evidence: Usage of
gh,git,rustup,cargo, andsolidcraft-clito perform administrative and development tasks. - Mitigation: The skill enforces a human-in-the-loop policy, requiring the user to approve every public action (forking, pushing, PR creation) and review all proposed content, which significantly mitigates the risk of unauthorized command execution.
Audit Metadata