@tank/frontend-craft
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 31, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
subprocess.runinscripts/search-components.pyandscripts/pull-all-registries.pyto interface with theshadcnCLI and manage its local cache. These operations are used for legitimate functionality, such as searching registries and installing components via the standardnpxtoolchain. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches registry and component metadata from
https://ui.shadcn.com. This is a well-known service for the frontend development ecosystem. The downloads are handled by the Pythonurllibmodule and are used to populate an offline search cache in thescripts/.cache/directory. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its ingestion of large amounts of third-party data.
- Ingestion points: Component names and descriptions are fetched from
https://ui.shadcn.com/r/registries.jsonand individual registry endpoints inscripts/pull-all-registries.py(line 118). - Boundary markers: The skill does not currently use explicit boundary markers or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings when presenting component data to the agent in
scripts/search-components.py. - Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to execute shell commands and write to the filesystem through the
npx shadcntool via the provided search scripts. - Sanitization: While
pull-all-registries.py(lines 25-115) includes extensiveSKIP_KEYWORDSandSKIP_REGISTRIESfilters to exclude low-quality or irrelevant content, it does not specifically sanitize for malicious prompt instructions hidden in registry metadata.
Audit Metadata