@tank/frontend-craft

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 31, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses subprocess.run in scripts/search-components.py and scripts/pull-all-registries.py to interface with the shadcn CLI and manage its local cache. These operations are used for legitimate functionality, such as searching registries and installing components via the standard npx toolchain.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches registry and component metadata from https://ui.shadcn.com. This is a well-known service for the frontend development ecosystem. The downloads are handled by the Python urllib module and are used to populate an offline search cache in the scripts/.cache/ directory.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its ingestion of large amounts of third-party data.
  • Ingestion points: Component names and descriptions are fetched from https://ui.shadcn.com/r/registries.json and individual registry endpoints in scripts/pull-all-registries.py (line 118).
  • Boundary markers: The skill does not currently use explicit boundary markers or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings when presenting component data to the agent in scripts/search-components.py.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to execute shell commands and write to the filesystem through the npx shadcn tool via the provided search scripts.
  • Sanitization: While pull-all-registries.py (lines 25-115) includes extensive SKIP_KEYWORDS and SKIP_REGISTRIES filters to exclude low-quality or irrelevant content, it does not specifically sanitize for malicious prompt instructions hidden in registry metadata.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
May 31, 2026, 11:04 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — @tank/frontend-craft