docker-compose-orchestration
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 5, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill provides numerous examples that mount the host's Docker daemon socket (
/var/run/docker.sock) into containers. This allows processes inside the container to control the host Docker service, effectively granting root-level access to the host machine. Evidence: found in SKILL.md (Example 8, 15) and EXAMPLES.md (Example 7, 8, 11, 15). - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: Instructions include patterns for mounting the host's root filesystem (
/) and critical system directories (/proc,/sys) into containers. This practice exposes the entire host file system to the container, bypassing isolation boundaries. Evidence: found in SKILL.md (Example 9) and EXAMPLES.md (Example 9, 10). - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: Multiple configuration examples contain hardcoded credentials, such as database passwords and application secrets. While provided as examples, they encourage the use of plaintext secrets in version-controlled files. Evidence: widespread use of values like
POSTGRES_PASSWORD=secret,JWT_SECRET=dev-secret, andMYSQL_ROOT_PASSWORD=root_secretacross all provided files. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process external configuration files (e.g.,
compose.yaml,.env) that can contain untrusted data, without providing sanitization or safety boundaries. * Ingestion points: SKILL.md and EXAMPLES.md (loading application configurations from the filesystem). * Boundary markers: None identified. * Capability inventory: Arbitrary shell command execution on the host and inside containers via the Docker CLI (docker compose up,exec,run). * Sanitization: None identified.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata