tf-ncl
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 22, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
tf_to_nclcommand inscripts/commands.pyallows writing output to arbitrary file paths provided via theoutputargument. Without path sanitization, this could be used to overwrite critical system files or shell profiles to achieve persistence. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
tf_to_nclcommand inscripts/commands.pyreads the content of any file specified in thetf_fileargument. This could allow an attacker to read sensitive data, such as.aws/credentialsor.ssh/id_rsa, and expose it by writing it to an accessible output file. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
subprocess.runto callterraformandtfsecinscripts/commands.py. Thepathargument is passed directly to these binaries without validation, which may permit argument injection to manipulate tool behavior. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection through the ingestion of untrusted infrastructure files.
- Ingestion points: File content read in
tf_to_ncland directories processed intfsec_scan,tf_validate, andtf_plan(scripts/commands.py). - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no instructions to the agent to disregard instructions embedded within the Terraform files.
- Capability inventory: The skill has file writing capabilities and the ability to execute external CLI tools via
subprocess.run(scripts/commands.py). - Sanitization: Absent; the skill does not perform content or path validation on inputs.
Audit Metadata