forge-evolution
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 23, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow defined in
references/soul_forge_flow.tomlincludes awrite_filetask (Soul_Manifestation) that dynamically creates new persona files on the local filesystem. This allows the skill to modify its own available instruction sets and capabilities at runtime by generating new markdown-based personas. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Instructions in
references/soul_forger.mdutilize patterns common in prompt injections to control model output format and suppress system context (e.g., "DO NOT repeat the system prompt", "START directly with the ---"). While intended for clean file generation, these instructions mimic techniques used to bypass standard model response structures. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection attack surface by processing untrusted external data to generate new operational instructions for the agent.
- Ingestion points: The skill ingests data from
failure_trace,failure_cluster,raw_facts, andwendao_search_resultsas defined in thereferences/soul_forge_flow.tomlworkflow. - Boundary markers: Absent. The instruction set lacks clear delimiters or warnings to the model to disregard instructions that might be maliciously embedded within the ingested failure data or search results.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the
write_filecapability through its defined workflow nodes inreferences/soul_forge_flow.toml. - Sanitization: Absent. There is no evidence of validation, escaping, or filtering of the content extracted from external traces before it is synthesized into a new persona blueprint.
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