markitdown
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 13, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains deceptive metadata, referencing non-existent AI models (e.g., 'google/gemini-3.1-pro-preview') and a service named 'Nano Banana Pro'. This misleading information could cause the agent to misjudge its capabilities or attempt to use non-functional features. Additionally, there is a mismatch between the stated author in the frontmatter ('K-Dense Inc.') and the actual skill developer ('tassiovale').
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents a surface for Indirect Prompt Injection by converting untrusted external documents into Markdown for agent consumption.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the context via
md.convert()calls inscripts/batch_convert.py,scripts/convert_literature.py, andscripts/convert_with_ai.py, which process various file formats (PDF, DOCX, XLSX) and external URLs. - Boundary markers: The scripts provide minimal boundary markers (such as simple markdown headers) but fail to include explicit instructions for the agent to ignore potentially malicious embedded commands within the converted content.
- Capability inventory: The skill operates within an environment granted powerful tools including
Bash,Read,Write, andEditaccess. - Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or validation of the converted document content is performed before it is presented to the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/generate_schematic.pyutilizes thesubprocessmodule to execute other internal scripts. While this is used for internal orchestration, it provides a mechanism for command execution that could be exploited if the agent is manipulated by malicious input derived from an untrusted document.
Audit Metadata