matchms
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 13, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The documentation includes several examples of using the
pickleformat for saving and loading spectral data (load_from_pickle,save_as_pickle). Since Python'spicklemodule can execute arbitrary code during deserialization, this represents a significant security risk if users load files from untrusted sources. - Evidence:
references/importing_exporting.mdexplicitly listsload_from_pickleandsave_as_picklefor fast data handling. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides instructions to download and install the
matchmspackage and its chemistry-related extensions from public registries using theuvtool. - Evidence:
SKILL.mdcontainsuv pip install matchmsanduv pip install matchms[chemistry]. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes shell-level commands for package installation and performs extensive file system operations to read and write mass spectrometry data files in various formats.
- Evidence: Code snippets in
SKILL.mdandreferences/workflows.mddemonstrate reading from and writing to files likeoutput.mgfandprocessed_data.pkl. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted metadata from external spectral library files, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions could be embedded in fields like compound names.
- Ingestion points:
load_from_mgf,load_from_mzml, andload_from_mspinreferences/importing_exporting.md. - Boundary markers: Absent; data is parsed into structured objects for similarity calculations without clear isolation for metadata processing.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to write files to the local system (
save_as_mgf, etc.). - Sanitization: While metadata harmonization filters are applied, they are designed for data consistency rather than filtering for prompt injection patterns.
Audit Metadata