pymc
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 21, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The file
references/workflows.mdincludes a code example demonstrating model persistence usingpickle.dump()andpickle.load(). Specifically, the callsaved = pickle.load(f)is inherently dangerous as it allows for arbitrary code execution if the.pklfile being loaded is malicious. While the documentation provides a textual warning to only trust your own files, the inclusion of this pattern in an automated agent's skill increases the risk of accidental or forced loading of untrusted objects. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions in
SKILL.mdrequire the installation of several Python packages, includingpymc,arviz, and optional samplers likenutpie. While these are well-known libraries, the automated installation of packages from external registries is a sensitive operation that requires monitoring. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: This skill identifies ingestion points for external data (predictors and outcomes) in
assets/linear_regression_template.pyandassets/hierarchical_model_template.pyvia variablesXandy. The skill lacks explicit boundary markers or sanitization logic to prevent embedded instructions in processed data from influencing agent behavior. Given the skill's extensive capabilities (Bash, File Write), this provides a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks. - [SAFE]: The core logic within the diagnostic scripts (
scripts/model_diagnostics.py) and model comparison utilities (scripts/model_comparison.py) follows standard statistical practices and does not exhibit malicious behavior.
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