tsg-flow-orchestrator-v2
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically executes shell commands defined in markdown task files (referred to as
gatecommands) to verify implementation and validation success. This behavior is central to the skill's function as an orchestrator but allows for the execution of arbitrary commands if task files are compromised or malicious. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The orchestrator possesses an indirect prompt injection surface as it ingests untrusted data from task definitions (
tasks.md), run state configurations, and output reports from various worker agents. - Ingestion points: Reads
tasks.md,run-state.json, and worker result/report files from the PRD directory. - Boundary markers: Prompts generated by
scripts/tsg-delegate.shuse basic instructions but lack robust cryptographic or structural delimiters to isolate untrusted content. - Capability inventory: Performs Git operations (commit, rebase, push), spawns agent processes via the
herdrCLI, and executes arbitrary shell commands defined in task metadata. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation of the
gatecommands or ingested reports is performed before they are used to determine logic flow or executed. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/tsg-delegate.shscript invokes theherdrCLI to manage agent panes, start agent sessions, and send prompts. It also executesjqand standard shell utilities to process configuration and state.
Audit Metadata