brand-adherence
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses several shell commands to manage local development and assets.
- It uses
ssh -p 2222 -o ExitOnForwardFailure=yes -R $CRAWL_ID:80:localhost:$SERVER_PORT tunnel.tasting.devto create a reverse tunnel, exposing the local development server to the vendor's verification engine. - it utilizes
curl -fsSLto download CSS, HTML, and image artifacts from URLs provided by the Brand API. - It suggests using
python3 -m http.server 3000 --bind 127.0.0.1to serve static files locally. - It uses
uuidgento generate unique identifiers for crawl sessions. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches external assets (CSS, HTML, images) using
curl. These downloads target URLs provided dynamically by theBrand API MCPtool during the extraction process. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest data from arbitrary, untrusted websites and incorporate it into a generated page.
- Ingestion points: Content is pulled from external URLs via
extract_websiteandget_website_result(includingartifactslike CSS and HTML). - Boundary markers: None are specified; the agent is instead instructed to treat values as authoritative.
- Capability inventory: The agent can write files, execute subprocesses (curl, ssh, python), and generate web content.
- Sanitization: The instructions explicitly demand "verbatim" copying of SVG code and CSS rules (e.g., "Paste those rules into your verbatim", "Take the logo from there and never redraw one"). This lack of sanitization could allow malicious content (like XSS payloads in SVGs or CSS expressions) from a reference site to be injected into the agent's output.
Audit Metadata