managing-google-workspace
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill relies on the
workspace-mcppackage, which is downloaded and executed at runtime using theuvxtool as specified inSKILL.md. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions define an execution mode that uses the system shell to run the
uvx workspace-mcp --clicommand for various workspace management tasks. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted data from multiple external sources while maintaining high-privilege capabilities.
- Ingestion points: External data is ingested via tools defined in
references/gmail.md(reading emails),references/drive.md(reading files),references/chat.md(reading chat messages), andreferences/search.md(processing search engine results). - Boundary markers: The provided instructions do not include explicit delimiters or instructions to the agent to disregard embedded commands within the external data being processed.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to sensitive tools including
send_gmail_message(sending email),manage_drive_access(modifying file permissions), andrun_script_function(executing Google Apps Script code). - Sanitization: The skill documentation does not specify any sanitization, escaping, or validation steps for content retrieved from external sources before it is interpreted by the agent.
Audit Metadata