codex-fix-pr
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted content from external sources that could be leveraged to influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: The
scripts/diagnose.shscript fetches GitHub Action logs usinggh run view --log-failed, andscripts/populate-description.shretrieves pull request titles and bodies usinggh pr view. - Boundary markers: Content is segmented with text-based headers (e.g.,
== failures ==,log:), but there are no explicit instructions or robust delimiters to prevent the agent from following instructions embedded within the ingested data. - Capability inventory: The agent can execute git commands (commit, rebase, push), perform GitHub operations, and run local test/build tasks via
mise. - Sanitization: There is no active sanitization or filtering of the ingested external content for malicious instruction patterns.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell scripts and orchestrates several development CLI tools.
- The
scripts/diagnose.shscript contains a hardcoded mapping between GitHub job names and localmisereproduction commands. Because the command strings are fixed in a shellcasestatement, job names from untrusted PRs cannot be used to inject arbitrary shell commands. - The agent relies on standard authenticated toolchains (
ghandgit) to implement the PR fixing workflow.
Audit Metadata