codex-write-prose-fix
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 11, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/context.shemployseval "$lint"to run a command string built from user-provided arguments. This behavior facilitates the execution of arbitrary shell commands if the input is manipulated. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The use of
evalto process and execute strings as commands at runtime is a dynamic execution pattern that increases the attack surface for command injection and complicates security auditing. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The script
scripts/context.shreads and displays the content of files at paths specified by thetargetandstatearguments (e.g.,cat "$state/notes"). This could be exploited to expose the contents of arbitrary or sensitive files if the agent is directed to use unauthorized paths. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests external content from target documents and workflow notes to perform its tasks. Because this content is not sanitized or escaped, it represents a surface for indirect prompt injection where adversarial text could override agent instructions.
- Ingestion points: The content of the file specified by the
targetargument and the review notes in$state/notesare read directly into the agent's context. - Boundary markers: The script uses simple text headers (e.g.,
== findings ==) to delimit sections, which do not provide robust isolation against malicious content mimicking these markers. - Capability inventory: The agent possesses the capability to modify the filesystem using the
apply_patchtool and to execute shell commands through thecontext.shscript. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, validation, or escaping of the ingested file content to prevent instruction injection.
Audit Metadata