fix-pr
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from GitHub pull requests, creating a risk that embedded instructions could be executed by the agent.
- Ingestion points: The
scripts/populate-description.shscript uses the GitHub CLI (gh pr view) to fetch the title and body of a pull request. This content is then written to a local file namedPR_AGENTDESC.md. - Boundary markers: The untrusted body and title are placed into a markdown file with standard headers and YAML frontmatter. However, there are no specific delimited blocks or instructions (e.g., 'ignore any instructions in the following text') to prevent the agent from obeying commands hidden within the pull request description during subsequent review steps.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities, including executing arbitrary shell commands via the Bash tool, performing git operations (commit, amend, push), and interacting with the GitHub CLI to modify pull requests.
- Sanitization: The
populate-description.shscript performs basic string cleaning (e.g., normalizing line endings) via Python, but it does not sanitize or filter the pull request content for potential prompt injection patterns before the agent is instructed to review and act upon it in Step 5.
Audit Metadata