write-prose-fix
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 11, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHDYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTION]: The skill uses dynamic context injection (
!) inSKILL.mdto executescripts/context.shat load time. This script receives$ARGUMENTSdirectly from the user or agent interaction without validation. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Inside
scripts/context.sh, the skill processes the user-supplied arguments and executes them usingeval "$lint". Because the$lintvariable is constructed from raw input, an attacker can provide a string that escapes the intended command and executes arbitrary shell commands on the host system during the skill load phase. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes the content of a target file and the output of the linting command, injecting both into the agent's context. This creates a surface for instructions embedded in documents to influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/context.shreads the user-specifiedtargetfile and captures stdout/stderr from the user-controlledlintcommand. - Boundary markers: The script uses basic text headers (e.g.,
== findings ==) to delimit sections, which can be easily bypassed by adversarial content within the ingested files. - Capability inventory: The skill is designed to perform file modifications and execute shell commands (
mise,vale, and the user-definedlintcommand). - Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or filtering is applied to the content of the target file or the command output before injection into the prompt.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata