write-prose-fix

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 11, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHDYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTION]: The skill uses dynamic context injection (!) in SKILL.md to execute scripts/context.sh at load time. This script receives $ARGUMENTS directly from the user or agent interaction without validation.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Inside scripts/context.sh, the skill processes the user-supplied arguments and executes them using eval "$lint". Because the $lint variable is constructed from raw input, an attacker can provide a string that escapes the intended command and executes arbitrary shell commands on the host system during the skill load phase.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes the content of a target file and the output of the linting command, injecting both into the agent's context. This creates a surface for instructions embedded in documents to influence agent behavior.
  • Ingestion points: scripts/context.sh reads the user-specified target file and captures stdout/stderr from the user-controlled lint command.
  • Boundary markers: The script uses basic text headers (e.g., == findings ==) to delimit sections, which can be easily bypassed by adversarial content within the ingested files.
  • Capability inventory: The skill is designed to perform file modifications and execute shell commands (mise, vale, and the user-defined lint command).
  • Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or filtering is applied to the content of the target file or the command output before injection into the prompt.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Oct 11, 2026, 05:23 AM