crypt-librarian
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of local helper scripts to manage its film archive and perform research. This includes Python scripts for API interaction (
exa_film_search.py,flexible_discovery.py) and Shell scripts for logging and data validation (log_discovery.sh,validate_year.sh). These operations are restricted to the skill's own directory and standard development paths. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill setup instructions guide the user to install the
requestslibrary via pip. This is a standard dependency for the Python scripts included in the repository. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it fetches film descriptions, critical discourse, and user-generated recommendations from external sources including Reddit, Exa (web search), and Firecrawl (web scraping).
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context through
flexible_discovery.py(Reddit JSON API),exa_film_search.py(Exa API results), andworkflows/film-researcher.md(Firecrawl scraping of Letterboxd/Criterion). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define specific XML or marker-based boundaries for untrusted data, though the
workflows/content-validator.mddefines a structured verification process to check candidates against exclusion criteria. - Capability inventory: The agent can write to the local
films.jsonarchive andcrypt.dbviascripts/crypt_db.py, and execute local shell/python scripts. - Sanitization: The Python scripts use standard URL encoding (
urllib.parse.quote) for search queries. The risk is mitigated by the fact that the agent is instructed to validate all discovered content against strict metadata filters (e.g., release year) before integration.
Audit Metadata