dag-typesafe
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data that could influence its behavior.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/analyze.pyand its associated extractors (python_extractor.py,typescript_extractor.py) read names, function signatures, and docstrings from the local repository and store them indag-registry.json. - Boundary markers:
scripts/compose.pyinterpolates the registry content into a prompt for the LLM without using delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the extracted docstrings. - Capability inventory:
scripts/compile.pygenerates executable Python or TypeScript code based on the output of the composition phase. - Sanitization: There is no sanitization or filtering of the docstring content extracted from the analyzed repository before it is sent to the LLM.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
compilecommand inscripts/compile.pygenerates standalone executable Python and TypeScript scripts based on thedag-plan.jsonartifact. While the skill employs an AST-based validator for predicate expressions to restrict dangerous operations, the core functionality is designed to generate code for later execution. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]:
scripts/compose.pymakes outbound HTTP POST requests using thehttpxlibrary to external LLM providers (defaulting to OpenRouter) to perform the DAG composition. This behavior is documented and configurable via environment variables likeDAG_LLM_BASE_URL.
Audit Metadata