image-well
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
subprocess.runinscripts/well.pyto execute theopencommand on macOS, which launches generated HTML search results in the default web browser. This functionality is intended for local user review and is restricted to opening the generated preview files. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs HTTP GET requests to fetch images and metadata from numerous third-party APIs, including NASA, Smithsonian, Met Museum, and Openverse. It supports downloading these assets to a local directory via the
download_resultsfunction inscripts/well.pybased on user-supplied queries. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/sources/__init__.pyfile utilizesimportlib.import_moduleto load internal image source provider classes. Module names are sourced from a hardcoded registry, which prevents arbitrary or unverified module loading at runtime. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted metadata from various external image APIs.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context via API responses processed in
searchmethods across multiple files inscripts/sources/(e.g.,openverse.py,wikimedia.py,nasa.py). - Boundary markers: None present for the raw metadata, but the content is constrained within structured JSON and HTML templates.
- Capability inventory: File writing (downloads) and browser execution via
subprocess.runinscripts/well.py. - Sanitization: The
format_htmlfunction inscripts/_well_utils.pymitigates injection risks by applyinghtml.escapeto titles, tags, and queries. Furthermore, a_safe_urlhelper validates URL protocols (restricting to http, https, or data URIs) before rendering content in the HTML preview output.
Audit Metadata