netlify-integration

Warn

Audited by Socket on Nov 6, 2026

5 alerts found:

Anomalyx3Securityx2
AnomalyLOW
references/twilio_aldea_specific.md

This is deployment guidance and sample webhook code, not evidence of an intentionally malicious package. The Twilio signature validator unconditionally accepts requests, permitting forged webhook submissions to reach SMS processing; Telnyx timestamp freshness is also unchecked, and asynchronous work may be lost after the response. The examples reference `TELNYX_PUBLIC_KEY`, `SUPABASE_SERVICE_KEY`, `SUPABASE_ANON_KEY`, `TELNYX_API_KEY`, `OPENROUTER_API_KEY`, and `NEXTAUTH_SECRET`; shown values are placeholders, not confirmed live credentials. Supabase and Netlify are referenced as `supabase[.]co` and `netlify[.]app`; severity is medium due to webhook authentication and replay risks, not demonstrated malware.

Confidence: 98%Severity: 68%
SecurityMEDIUM
scripts/test_function_locally.sh

This local testing script sends requests to a Netlify function, but evaluates a curl command assembled from untrusted arguments and file data, creating a command-injection vulnerability. It also writes response output to the predictable path /tmp/curl_response.txt, which can be abused through a pre-existing symlink, and may expose sensitive custom headers through verbose output. No external domain, embedded credential, or clear malicious behavior is present; severity is elevated if untrusted users can invoke the script or control its inputs.

Confidence: 98%Severity: 78%
SecurityMEDIUM
assets/webhook_function_template.ts

This webhook handler accepts any POST request with a body because validateSignature always returns true, then parses the untrusted body as JSON. This is a significant authentication-bypass risk if the endpoint is intended to accept only trusted webhook senders. No data exfiltration or other malicious behavior is evident in this fragment.

Confidence: 99%Severity: 72%
AnomalyLOW
assets/examples/webhook-function.ts

This handler processes and forwards POST webhook bodies to a Netlify background function. If process.env.URL is unset, an attacker-controlled Host header can influence the outbound request destination, potentially forwarding the body to an external host; the body is also logged. This is a security concern, but the fragment shows no clear evidence of intentional malware.

Confidence: 97%Severity: 55%
AnomalyLOW
assets/examples/api-route.ts

This code implements webhook handling and contains no clear evidence of intentional malware. The primary security concern is SSRF and possible disclosure of signed webhook payloads because the forwarding URL is derived from untrusted request headers; the separate handler also lacks authentication. Overall severity is moderate, with risk depending on reachability and webhook-secret exposure.

Confidence: 98%Severity: 55%
Audit Metadata
Analyzed At
Nov 6, 2026, 03:23 AM
Package URL
pkg:socket/skills-sh/tdimino%2Fclaude-code-minoan%2Fnetlify-integration%2F@d162dd2dd86109c79b188ed45f8a50556b6e23361ae3a89693154d546dcbc258