omnisearch
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing local Python scripts to perform specialized searches and integration tests.
- Evidence:
scripts/omnisearch.pyandscripts/test_omnisearch.pyutilizesubprocess.runto call sibling scripts such asxpoz_search.pyand external skill scripts likeexa_search.py. - Analysis: Commands are constructed as lists and executed without the shell (
shell=False), which effectively prevents shell command injection. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill aggregates and processes untrusted data from multiple external web and social media sources, presenting a potential surface for indirect injection.
- Ingestion points: Data from Brave, Tavily, Xpoz, Exa, and Firecrawl enter the agent context via
scripts/omnisearch.py,scripts/brave_search.py,scripts/tavily_search.py, andscripts/xpoz_search.py. - Boundary markers: The skill does not use explicit delimiters or specific instructions to the LLM to ignore potentially malicious instructions embedded in the search results.
- Capability inventory: The skill can perform network operations via
requestsand execute local scripts viasubprocess.run. - Sanitization: Content is truncated and normalized for display, but no escaping or filtering for prompt injection patterns is implemented.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill communicates with several external search providers' APIs to retrieve data.
- Evidence: Scripts use the
requestslibrary to connect toapi.search.brave.com,api.tavily.com, andmcp.xpoz.ai. - Analysis: These connections are directed to the official endpoints of the search providers described in the skill's documentation.
Audit Metadata