resend
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from multiple sources which is then transmitted to an external API, creating a vulnerability to indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Reads data from
stdinin_read_stdin(), reads HTML file content via--htmlin_resolve_html(), and reads arbitrary files for attachments via--attachmentsin_encode_attachment()withinscripts/send.py. - Boundary markers: No technical boundary markers or sanitization logic is implemented for the ingested content. The skill relies on instructional warnings in
SKILL.mddirecting the agent to get explicit user approval before execution. - Capability inventory: The skill combines file-reading capabilities (any file path provided to
--attachmentsor--html) with network-writing capabilities (POST requests to the well-known serviceapi.resend.comas defined inscripts/_resend_utils.py). - Sanitization: The skill performs no sanitization, escaping, or validation of the email body content or attachment data before transmission.
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