telegram

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 19, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/telegram_memory.py modifies the Python module search path (sys.path) at runtime to include directories in the user's home folder (~/.claudicle/adapters/shared, ~/.claudicle/daemon, and ~/.claude/skills/shared). This allows the skill to dynamically load code from computed local paths outside its own directory.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and processes messages from external Telegram users, which are stored in ~/.claudicle/daemon/inbox.jsonl. This data is untrusted and could contain malicious instructions designed to manipulate the agent.
  • Ingestion points: ~/.claudicle/daemon/inbox.jsonl (incoming message log).
  • Boundary markers: The documentation in SKILL.md states that user input is sanitized for XML tags before processing.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can send messages (telegram_send.py), manage persistent user memory, and access various internal data structures.
  • Sanitization: Sanitization for XML tags is claimed in the documentation.
  • [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill accesses sensitive local files including message history logs (~/.claudicle/daemon/inbox.jsonl) and the agent's internal memory models (~/.claudicle/daemon/memory/). Access to these files is necessary for the skill's stated purpose but represents an exposure risk if misused.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
May 19, 2026, 04:39 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — telegram