teable-assistant-ops
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from several external sources, including web scraping results (via the
scrape runmodule) and database records. This content is integrated into the agent's context without explicit boundary markers or sanitization, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks. - Ingestion points: External data is ingested via
teable record get,teable sql-query, and the web scraping functionality described inguides/scrape-guide.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not prescribe the use of delimiters or warnings to prevent the AI from obeying instructions embedded in the retrieved content.
- Capability inventory: The agent possesses high-impact capabilities, including full database CRUD, sending emails via the
send-emailcommand, and deploying automation scripts. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation routines are defined for data retrieved from external sources before it is used to drive subsequent actions.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill enables the generation and deployment of JavaScript code for server-side automations using the
teable automation generate-scriptcommand. While this is a core functionality of the Teable platform, it allows for the runtime creation and execution of code based on AI-generated content. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies extensively on the
teableCLI for its operations. It includes a local installation script,scripts/install.sh, which automates the setup of the vendor's command-line tools and authentication. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The provided installation script downloads and installs the official
@teable/clipackage from the public npm registry. These downloads are associated with the vendor's official infrastructure.
Audit Metadata