blueprint
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting and processing untrusted data from the user-provided requirements document.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads
<spec_dir>/requirements.mdin Phase 0.2 using theReadtool. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit boundary markers or "ignore previous instructions" warnings defined when the requirement content is interpolated into the prompts for sub-agents (
contract-deriver,taskgraph-planner, andverify-planner). - Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands via
hoyeon-cli, write files to the filesystem (e.g.,/tmp,plan.json,contracts.md), and dispatch specialized sub-agents. - Sanitization: The skill lacks explicit sanitization or escaping mechanisms for the requirement text before it is used in downstream prompt construction.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing a local CLI tool for state management and validation.
- Evidence: Throughout the SKILL.md, bash commands are used to invoke
hoyeon-clifor operations likeplan init,plan merge,plan get, andplan validate. - Context: These operations use temporary JSON files in
/tmpto safely pass data to the CLI, which is a standard pattern for the vendor's toolset.
Audit Metadata