agent-council
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes external CLI tools (such as
claude,codex, orgemini) as defined in thecouncil.config.yamlconfiguration file. This is implemented using Node.jschild_process.spawnwithout a shell, which effectively prevents command injection via user-provided prompts. The implementation logic is found inscripts/council-job-worker.jswhere the command string is parsed into a program and an arguments array. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
scripts/council-job.jsscript includes a recommendation to install theyamldependency or update the skill vianpx github:team-attention/agent-councilif requirements are not met. This targets the author's own official repository for project-specific tooling and is a standard deployment method for this utility. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill acts as a proxy, ingestion user prompts and passing them directly to multiple configured agent CLIs for opinion gathering.
- Ingestion points: The user's
promptis captured inscripts/council-job.js(line 330) and passed to the worker processes. - Boundary markers: None are explicitly used to wrap or delimit the user input before it is passed to the sub-agents.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to spawn arbitrary processes as defined in its local configuration file.
- Sanitization: No content-based sanitization is performed on the user's prompt, although the skill mitigates command injection by avoiding shell execution in the
spawncall inscripts/council-job-worker.js(line 114).
Audit Metadata