history-insight
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes several standard shell utilities to manage session data, including
findfor file discovery,statfor metadata filtering,splitfor batching large files, andjqfor JSON processing. These are invoked inSKILL.mdand the providedscripts/extract-session.shscript to parse session logs. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection because it processes raw conversation history from past sessions.
- Ingestion points: Conversation history is read from
~/.claude/projects/**/*.jsonlinSKILL.md(Step 2 and 3) and viascripts/extract-session.sh. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit boundary markers or instructions to the subagent (
Task(opus)) to treat the extracted history strictly as data. This increases the risk that instructions embedded in past conversations could be followed by the subagent during the summarization phase. - Capability inventory: The skill environment allows for subprocess execution (shell commands), file reading, and invocation of subagents.
- Sanitization: While the skill filters for specific message types (text) using
jq, it does not perform sanitization or filtering for malicious prompt patterns within the text content before analysis.
Audit Metadata