event-prospecting
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) because it ingests untrusted data from external conference platforms and company websites.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via
scripts/extract_event.mjs(speaker bios and names) andscripts/extract_page.mjs(web page body and meta tags). - Boundary markers: The subagent prompts defined in
references/workflow.mdlack explicit delimiters or "ignore instructions" wrappers to isolate untrusted web content from the agent's instructions. - Capability inventory: The skill has access to the
bashtool, which is used to execute local Node.js scripts and thebrowseCLI. - Sanitization:
scripts/extract_page.mjsperforms basic sanitization by stripping HTML tags from the extracted body text. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill extensively uses the
bashtool to coordinate its pipeline, executing several local Node.js scripts (recon.mjs,extract_event.mjs,extract_page.mjs,compile_report.mjs) and thebrowseCLI. This execution is fundamental to the skill's data extraction and reporting capabilities. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The extraction scripts (
recon.mjsandextract_event.mjs) utilizebrowse evalto execute JavaScript strings within a browser environment. This is used to extract structured data from__NEXT_DATA__blocks and other page elements on external websites.
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