skills-manager
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 27, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill is designed to fetch content from multiple external sources. It retrieves a skill registry from
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/heilcheng/awesome-agent-skills/main/README.mdand usesgit cloneor the GitHub API to download repository contents from various individual users, such ascoffeefuelbump,chrisvoncsefalvay,lackeyjb,zxkane, andsmerchek. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The instructions mandate that the agent "Test any relative imports" and "Always test skills before committing" for the newly imported content. This workflow could lead to the execution of unvetted scripts or code contained within the third-party repositories during the validation phase.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill frequently uses shell commands such as
git clone,git sparse-checkout,git submodule, andcurlto manipulate the local file system and synchronize with remote repositories. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Because the skill possesses both network access (via
WebFetchandcurl) and the ability to read from the repository, a malicious imported skill being executed during the "test" phase could potentially exfiltrate sensitive configuration files or repository data. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an indirect prompt injection surface. It ingests untrusted data from the
awesome-agent-skillsregistry and individualSKILL.mdfiles. - Ingestion points:
SKILL.md(Workflow steps for fetching and parsing). - Boundary markers: Absent. No specific delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present.
- Capability inventory: Extensive, including
git push, file writes, and the general "test/validate" instruction acrossSKILL.md. - Sanitization: Absent. The agent is instructed to normalize metadata but not to sanitize the instructions or scripts within the imported skills.
Audit Metadata