archive
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from session transcripts and conversation history to create archives and memory candidates.
- Ingestion points: Reads conversation history and transcript files located at
~/.claude/projects/<project>/<uuid>.jsonlto curate past events. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or 'ignore' instructions when processing content from the session transcripts.
- Capability inventory: The skill can push data to an archive log and suggest facts for the
/helix-memorytool, which may be persisted long-term. - Sanitization: The instructions emphasize quoting prompts 'verbatim' and only trimming large logs, lacking explicit sanitization of potentially malicious instructions embedded in the session history.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell commands like
sedandkillto manage the lifecycle of the archive server by targeting specific Process IDs (PIDs) stored in local metadata files (~/.helix/archive/<project>/<slug>/server.json). - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill accesses sensitive session transcript files (
.jsonl) which contain the full history of user interactions. While necessary for the 'archive' functionality, this involves the reading of potentially sensitive user data stored in the local environment.
Audit Metadata