canvas
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and act upon data from external, potentially untrusted sources which could contain malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: Reads external 'rails' via the
helix railscommand and processes user-generated notes, comments, and event deltas viahelix canvas waitand API calls. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or 'ignore embedded instructions' markers when processing external data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to Bash and PowerShell for tool execution,
curlfor local network requests, and implicit file read/write capabilities for managing artifacts. - Sanitization: There are no explicit requirements or steps provided for sanitizing or validating the content read from the canvas or rails before it is integrated into the agent's context.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill generates interactive UI components that involve dynamic code execution.
- HTML Cards: Supports
htmlcards which render a sandboxed iframe with scripts allowed. - Prototype Cards: Supports
prototypecards that use JSX modules (React) and allow users to tune values that are then processed by the agent. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions for managing local system processes.
- Process Management: Recommends terminating server processes using a shell pipeline:
kill "$(sed -n 's/.*"pid": *\([0-9]*\).*/\1/p' ~/.helix/canvas/<project>/<slug>/server.json)". This relies on the integrity of a locally stored JSON file containing process IDs. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses sensitive user data for diagnostic purposes.
- File Access: Instructs the agent to read user-uploaded screenshots and attachments from
~/.helix/canvas/<project>/<slug>/uploads/using file reading tools to assist in debugging and collaboration.
Audit Metadata